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INTRODUCTION
TAKAO FUKUCHI
YURI SATO
URING the period of high economic growth, Indonesia’s manufacturing sector
had acted as the engine for that growth and had played an important role in
offering modern employment opportunities, improving technological capa-
bilities, and promoting non-oil exports. But after the outbreak of the Asian currency
crisis in July 1997, the Indonesian economy went into decline, experiencing a free
fall in the real economy and bad inflation in 1998. These volatile economic changes
were also accompanied by a drastic change in political leadership in May 1998.
Since the crisis began the manufacturing sector has been badly affected by the
economic and political difficulties, nevertheless the sector is once again expected
to play a central role in economic recovery and development in the future. For this
reason it is important and useful to examine the manufacturing sector’s past achieve-
ments, its current status, and the role it can be expected to play in the future in
conjunction with the relevant policies that the government will need to carry out.
The publication of this special issue was first planned in 1998, but as the impact
of the Krismon (the Indonesian term for the monetary crisis) widened, the schedule
of publication was extended by one year because of the uncertainties arising from
the continued economic recession and political turmoil. Even as of mid-2000, the
negative effects of the Krismon still persist, and the recent substantial depreciation
of rupiah to over Rp 9,000 to the dollar indicates that the prospects for recovery are
as yet very fragile. The difficulty of gauging the future course of the economy along
with weak statistical data hampered the preparation of the papers for this issue, and
the completion of this volume has been due to the strenuous efforts of all the re-
searchers who have written papers for this project.
Issues Confronting the Economy before the Crisis
In its second twenty-five-year plan (1994–2018), the Indonesian government
planned to increase the nation’s per capita income from the then current level of
1,000 U.S. dollars to 3,500 U.S. dollars so as to successfully join the medium-
income group of developing countries. Given the impossibility of increasing rice
production in Java, and the possible future exhaustion of oil resources, the engine
of economic growth had to be the non-oil export-oriented industrial sector. To suc-
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cessfully penetrate world markets, the country’s technological capability had to be
improved over time, and to achieve this the skilled labor–intensive, capital-inten-
sive, and technology-intensive subsectors had to grow quickly and become core
sectors of the economy. But as many studies argued, the pace of diversification was
rather slow compared with the overall expansion of manufacturing output, and the
technological improvement of the Indonesian manufacturing sector was not ca-
pable enough to catch up with the advanced developing countries.
On the other hand, Indonesia has always had an abundance of labor, and two-
thirds of urban workers belong to the informal sector.1 So one of the top priorities of
the second twenty-five-year plan was to increase employment opportunities and
improve labor conditions. While the unskilled labor–intensive and resource-inten-
sive subsectors had to continue to offer the major share of employment opportuni-
ties, the absorption of labor force was not fast enough to keep up with the expand-
ing labor force population which was growing by more than 2 million annually.
Therefore a harmonized pattern of industrialization was badly needed to simul-
taneously satisfy policy targets such as (1) the improvement of technological capa-
bilities and international competitiveness to increase exports, (2) the increase of
employment opportunities and improvement of worker living conditions, and (3)
the conservation of the environment and natural resources. Thus even before the
economic crisis began, Indonesian industry stood at an important crossroad and
had to select an optimum balance of future evolving pattern in order to successfully
climb up the technological ladder and effectively utilize its human resources.
Outbreak of the Asian Currency Crisis and the Krismon
The Indonesian economy was already struggling with many problems even be-
fore the Krismon. It was suffering from accumulated external debts, stagnant non-
oil exports, volatile agricultural output due to unstable climate, insufficient absorp-
tion of a growing labor force population, a weak banking sector with poorly
performing loans, a frail corporate sector with a high foreign debt and weak risk
management, a large population of the poor, frustrated resource-rich regions due to
the biased distribution of the fruits of growth, and environmental degradation and
depletion of natural resources. Thus from the structural point of view the economy
was ill-prepared for the currency crisis that broke out in July 1997. First the Thai
baht was heavily attacked and collapsed. The currency crisis immediately spread to
Indonesia and then to the Republic of Korea. The Indonesian central bank first tried
to keep the exchange rate within the lower end of the band at around Rp 2,400 to the
1 Takao Fukuchi, “Chiiki keizaigaku teki bunseki to kaihatsu mondai: Jissh$o bunseki fur $emuw$aku
no k$ochiku—Indoneshia no jirei, Nihon o sank$o toshite” [Regional economic analysis and devel-
opment problems: Construction of framework for empirical studies—Indonesia and Japan as main
reference countries], in Keizai hatten to chiiki keizai k$oz $o [Economic development and regional
economic strucuture], ed. Koichi Ohno (Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies, 2000).
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dollar but gave up the effort in August. The exchange rate was floated and capital
flight increased as the confidence of investors deteriorated. The exchange rate reached
Rp 4,700 to the dollar by early December 1997 which left the currency at half its
pre-crisis value.
In early December President Soeharto suddenly announced ten-days rest and
cancelled his planned foreign visit for reasons of health which caused the rupiah to
fall sharply to Rp 6,000 to the dollar. Thereafter the Krismon changed from a mon-
etary crisis to a crisis of confidence in the national leadership. The Krismon impact
extended to the real sector which caused an economic free fall bringing volatile
inflation and massive unemployment. Thus the political instability directly affected
the whole economy, which in turn gave rise to social movements demanding politi-
cal reform. The negative spiral of political and economic collapse reached its nadir
when Soeharto’s government, which had ruled for thirty-two years, collapsed in May
1998, and the rupiah tumbled to Rp 16,000 to the dollar in June. The social and
economic turmoil began to stabilize gradually only during the second half of 1998.
Summary of Each Paper
There are many important questions about Indonesia’s manufacturing sector. How
far had the sector developed and diversified, and what was its actual status before
the crisis? How and to what degree were the different subsectors influenced or
damaged by the Krismon? What were the main factors accounting for the contrast-
ing effects exerted on different subsectors? What role can be expected of the manu-
facturing sector in promoting economic recovery? Considering the great diversity
of these problems, it was decided when planning this project to take up these issues
through a collaboration of Indonesian and Japanese scholars with expertise in dif-
ferent disciplines. Thus the content and approach of each paper in this special issue
is quite diverse in terms of methodologies (econometric models and analysis, inten-
sity of field work, literature surveyed) and perspectives (export competitiveness,
subsector analysis, small and medium-sized enterprises). This diversity is a mani-
festation of the complexity and vastness of the development issues concerning the
Indonesian manufacturing sector, and we hope that the academic discussion pre-
sented in this special issue can serve as a step toward understanding the reality of
Indonesia and provide further intellectual communication between Indonesia and
the rest of the world. The remainder of this introduction will briefly summarize
each paper in this special issue.
Thee Kian Wie: “The Impact of the Economic Crisis on Indonesia’s Manufactur-
ing Sector” first surveys the trends in the pre-crisis period until 1997, then exam-
ines the impact of the crisis on various components of the manufacturing sector,
such as production, the number of large and medium-sized enterprises, employ-
ment in these enterprises, the level of capacity utilization in these enterprises, trends
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in small and cottage enterprises, investment, exports, and performance. Through
the reforms and deregulation of the early 1990s, manufacturing exports grew by 27
per cent during 1989–93. But during 1994–97 the growth rate dropped to 7 per cent
mainly due to the stagnation of labor-intensive and resource-intensive exports. The
factors for this decline and the need to develop limited technological capabilities
were already topics of intensive discussion before the Krismon hit Indonesia. Al-
though there has been a slight recovery since 1999, according to Thee, this has been
mainly due to increased consumer demand.
Thee’s study found that the Krismon had the following major impacts on the
manufacturing sector: (a) Industrial output decreased by 12.9 per cent in 1998, and
the transport equipment and machinery, the cement and nonmetal mineral, and the
iron and steel subsectors suffered most. (b) Between 1996 and 1998, the number of
large and medium-sized enterprises decreased by 2,500 (−11 per cent); employ-
ment decreased by 680,000 workers (−16 per cent); capacity utilization decreased
from 78 per cent to 72 per cent; and the number of small and cottage industries
decreased by around 670,000 (−23 per cent). (c) From 1997 to 1998, capital goods
imports decreased from $9.3 billion to $5.8 billion (−38 per cent); approved
domestic investment decreased from Rp 79 trillion to Rp 45 trillion (−43 per cent);
and approved foreign direct investment decreased from $23 billion to $8 billion
(−64 per cent). (d) Although the exchange rate depreciated greatly, manufactured
exports stayed almost constant: $35.0 billion in 1997 and $34.6 billion in 1998.
(e) The survey of about 1,200 firms by the World Bank–BAPPENAS-BPS revealed
that the impact of the crisis on the performance of firms was mixed: domestic mar-
ket–oriented firms suffered greater than export-oriented and foreign-affiliated firms;
the number of Java-based firms declined the most; the number of highly leveraged
firms and firms with foreign currency liabilities experienced a smaller decline be-
cause most of these firms were export-oriented; the major causes for the reduction
in the output of firms were the decrease in domestic demand, the increase in the
cost of imported materials, and the higher cost of capital. Thee emphasized the
importance of bank and corporate debt restructuring and the increase of manufac-
tured exports for recovery in the short term, while enhanced industrial technology
capabilities would be needed for the sustainable long-run development of the manu-
facturing sector.
Haryo Aswicahyono and Mari Pangestu: “Indonesia’s Recovery: Exports and
Regaining Competitiveness” concentrates on evaluating the competitive power of
Indonesia’s manufacturing sector, and analyzes the trends before and after the
Krismon. The paper first looked at the volume and value of non-oil exports during
1991–99. It then undertook a formal RCA (revealed comparative advantage) and
trade map analysis (1986–96), and a CMS (constant market share) analysis (1986–
96) of exports and imports for the pre-crisis period, and it showed the commodity
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effect, country effect, and competitiveness effect by subsector. The paper finishes
with a discussion of Indonesia’s future export competitiveness and the necessary
policies for realizing sustainable development of manufactured exports. All the
observations and analyses were based on the detailed decomposition of the manu-
facturing sector into ISIC three-digit subsectors or adequate subgroups.
As indicated above, this is an empirical study which provides a survey and analy-
sis of Indonesia’s export competitiveness before and after the crisis. The growth
rate of export declined between 1995 and 1997 before the crisis occurred, and the
reasons for this decline have been the topic of much discussion. Aswicahyono and
Pangestu pointed out the effects of some important cyclical factors and the decline
of oil prices. Also they performed subsectoral RCA and CMS analyses to clarify
the long-term structural trends of the industrial sector. The weighted RCA index
declined rapidly between 1986 and 1996. In particular, the RCA of five highly
competitive industries (wood and wood products, apparel, petroleum refining, non-
ferrous metals, and tobacco which make up 44 per cent of Indonesia’s total exports)
declined. Meanwhile natural resource–intensive industries and unskilled labor–in-
tensive industries flourished between 1987 and 1992, but lost competitiveness dur-
ing 1992–96. Only capital-intensive industries and human capital–intensive indus-
tries continued to grow during 1992–96, although they had only just started to grow
and their shares were still quite small. These, according to Aswicahyono and
Pangestu, were the basic trends before the Krismon.
Two important consequences of the Krismon pointed out in this study are: (1) a
big decline in real wages due to rapid inflation, although nominal wages have been
increasing recently, and (2) a collapse of corporate investment. How will these con-
straining factors influence the future comparative advantage and the country’s ex-
port structure? The two authors argue that in the short run exports will not be the
main engine for recovery due to their reliance on imported inputs, therefore the
existing sources of competitiveness will have to be utilized effectively until the
more pressing medium-term issues can be dealt with. The most crucial of these
medium-term issues is technological capability. Indonesia will need to build a broad
and substantial base of human capital like the East Asian newly industrialized econo-
mies. For that purpose, the authors stress the important roles of education and for-
eign direct investment.
Takao Fukuchi: “Econometric Analysis of the Effects of Krismon Shocks on
Indonesia’s Industrial Subsectors” analyzes the effect of the Krismon on the indus-
trial sector by employing monthly time-series data (January 1996–December 1998),
and by constructing a monthly econometric model which divides the manufactur-
ing sector into nine ISIC subsectors. After observing the trends of major economic
variables, Fukuchi divided the whole Krismon period (July 1997–December 1998)
into three subperiods: the bandwagon subperiod (August–December 1997), the free
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fall subperiod (January–July 1998), and the stagnation subperiod (August–Decem-
ber 1998). One significant feature of the Krismon was the substantial political in-
stability that occurred in the second subperiod which caused great economic tur-
moil. The exchange rate in particular recorded two big drops, in January and June
1998, which cannot be properly explained economically because they were mainly
caused by noneconomic disturbance. Therefore, Fukuchi estimated an exchange
rate function using data up to the end of the first subperiod based on five important
economic variables. He then calculated the prediction errors of the exchange rate in
the second and third subperiods, and defined them as the noneconomic disturbance
(NEDIS). Thus the main part of this paper was to analyze econometrically the trends
of production indices for manufacturing subsectors based on economic indices as
well as on the noneconomic disturbance constructed above. After observing the
trends, Fukuchi classified the subsectors into three groups: (1) the agriculture-re-
lated industry, (2) the light industry, and (3) the capital goods industry. The first
group was damaged but quickly recovered and reached its all-time highest level of
output in December 1998. The second group showed volatile changes and its level
of production in December 1998 was 11 per cent below the pre-Krismon level. The
third group had flourished before the Krismon, but was damaged very badly by the
crisis, and its level of production in December 1998 was only half that of the pre-
Krismon level. Thus the Krismon produced sharp contrasts. Some subsectors ben-
efited from the big depreciation of the rupiah and the quick expansion of exports,
while others suffered greatly from supply side factors (shortages of imported mate-
rials and limited financing capacity) and also from demand side factors (collapse of
domestic demand). Fukuchi estimated the equations to explain the monthly trends
of production indices for subsectors (January 1996–December 1998), and pointed
out the major contributing factors. He also presented the results of projections until
December 1999 and showed the continuation of the Krismon’s contrasting effects
on different subsectors. Following his analysis of this two-sided effect of the crisis,
Fukuchi stressed the importance of further diversification of the manufacturing sector
beyond the present short-term crisis management in order to secure the sustainable
development of Indonesia’s manufacturing sector.
Iwan Jaya Azis: “The Nonlinear General Equilibrium Impact of the Financial
Crisis and the Downfall of Manufacturing” employs a nonlinear CGE (computable
general equilibrium) model to present a comprehensive analysis of the negative
impact of the Krismon on income distribution and the manufacturing sector. The
paper provides a description of social indicators and presents an impact analysis.
Many social indicators show the serious damage caused by the Krismon. Open
unemployment in urban areas increased by 21 per cent from 2.5 million in 1997 to
3.1 million in 1998; real wages decreased by 26.7 per cent from the second quarter
of 1997 to the second quarter of 1998; and the health morbidity rate increased over
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time, although the fear of a sharp drop in enrollment rates at primary and secondary
schools proved unfounded.
The focus of this paper is mainly on the use of a CGE model based on the exten-
sion of the social accounting matrix. The impact of the Krismon on this matrix was
estimated at the macroeconomic level and the manufacturing subsector levels, and
it was also estimated on the income, assets, and expenditures of eight different
types of households in urban and rural areas. One of the features of the CGE model
used by Azis is the endogenous treatment of prices and its nonlinearity. The house-
hold sector distributes wealth into narrow money, time deposits, and equity, while
the supply of money is modeled through a money multiplier and high-powered
money. The real sector resembles the class of common CGE models. The model
depicts the vicious circle structure of the crisis by an interesting circular causality:
from confidence deterioration to capital outflow, then to exchange rate collapse,
stagnant investment, severe recession, and again to confidence deterioration. The
impact of this circle expands through four repercussions, and results in the overall
downfall of the economy. The paper shows the different negative effects of the
Krismon on households, and summarizes the effects by calculating the Gini
coefficient. It shows clearly that the Krismon induced a big fall in the macroeconomy,
and also exerted a skewed negative impact on different households: there was a fall
of approximately 60 per cent for urban high-income and urban low-income house-
holds, 40 per cent for rural low-income households, and 30 per cent for rural high-
income households. The paper showed clearly that the manufacturing sector was
greatly damaged by the collapse of demand because of the fall in household in-
come.
Anggito Abimanyu: “Impact of Agriculture Trade and Subsidy Policy on the
Macroeconomy, Distribution, and Environment in Indonesia” is interested in find-
ing a good combination of policies to revitalize the agricultural sector and
agroindustry with special attention to the impact of the crisis on household con-
sumption and the environment. He selected import tariff cuts and government sub-
sidies as two policies, and calculated the overall economic and social impact of
these policies based on simulation experiments using a CGE (computable general
equilibrium) model specifically designed for the Indonesian economy.
Abimanyu begins by stressing the important role of the agricultural sector in the
economic crisis and recovery periods. He then summarizes the past research on the
impact of international trade and trade liberalization on the environment and says
that, although the impact has been ambiguous, it is important to take their effects on
the environment into consideration when discussing policies for revitalizing the
agricultural sector. He also stresses the importance of the impact on the distribu-
tional side of the economy. To clarify the overall impact of suitable policies,
Abimanyu employed a CGE model, which has been dubbed INDORANI, to imple-
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ment comparative-static simulations. The model included simulation equations which
described groups of variables or relationships: the demand of producers for inter-
mediate goods, primary inputs, and investment goods; commodity supplies; house-
hold consumption demand; export demand; government expenditure; output values
and cost identities; market clearing conditions; and other macro indicators and price
variables. INDORANI contained sixty-eight industries, seventy-three commodi-
ties, seven occupational groups, and ten income classes. After explaining the basic
mechanism and equations, Abimanyu explained the results of his simulation ex-
periments and presented the results of four simulations: (1) crisis simulation to
specify the baseline, (2) import tariff cut by 10 per cent, (3) increase of fertilizer
subsidy by 10 per cent, (4) combination of increasing subsidy to poor farmers and
tariff cut. Three policy simulations, (2)–(4), increased GDP, real consumption, em-
ployment, and price levels, and also damaged competitiveness, but they produced
different effects on exports and governmental revenues and expenditures. Also the
effects of the simulations on sectors, occupational groups, and income classes were
very different. Subsidy increases benefited large manufacturing in the area of out-
put and employment; this was especially true for fertilizer, pesticide, and other
agriculture-related subsectors. On the other hand, tariff cuts benefited small manu-
facturing. Subsidy increases also mainly benefited higher-income classes. Thus
Abimanyu stressed the importance of targeting poor farmers. According to him,
environmental damage comes mainly from domestic activities, while international
trade has little effect. Finally he stressed the importance of such simulation experi-
ments for providing an overall assessment of policy effects, while also stressing the
importance of properly understanding merits and limits of simulations.
Yuri Sato: “How Did the Crisis Affect Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises?
From a Field Study of the Metal-Working Industry in Java” concentrates on an
analysis of the impact of the Krismon on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
based on field studies Sato conducted during the crisis. The impact on the SMEs is
hard to assess in a comprehensive way because the government’s annual industrial
statistics only cover large and medium-sized enterprises. The paper first reviews
the limited available statistics and studies related to SMEs during the crisis period
and then presents the author’s field study results on such aspects as the impact on
SME performance, factors affecting this performance, and SMEs’ responses to the
crisis. Sato’s field studies were conducted in several selected locations in Java which
included Metropolitan Jakarta, local cities, and a rural cluster. The author conducted
intensive interviews with fifty owners of SMEs, all engaged in metal-working and
machinery component manufacturing. This industry was the worst-hit subsector
during the Krismon, and 65 per cent of the interviewees reported that the perfor-
mance of their companies had been adversely affected. But the study also found
that the performance of SMEs in this subsector showed a wide variation, ranging
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from those making no profits and halting production to those enjoying a jump in
turnover several times higher than before the crisis. The paper examined a number
of possible factors for explaining the varying performance: market orientation, size,
location, linkages, and debt exposure of the SMEs. It found that the most signifi-
cant factors were market orientation and linkages. The best-performing SMEs were
successful in switching or shifting products to export-oriented or government-re-
lated projects. Increasing demand for import substitution and inferior goods were
other positive market factors. In shifting products, the SMEs effectively utilized
their existing linkages with wholesalers-cum-putters-out who were capable of find-
ing markets. On the other hand, SMEs which had linkages with specific assemblers
and user-factories were mostly negatively affected. The young SMEs that had just
started to grow as subcontractors in the urban industrial agglomeration were a latter
case. Thus the study indicated that the linkages in which SMEs were embedded
very much influenced SME performance during the crisis. Interestingly, SME re-
sponses for survival varied by individual enterprise and were not dependent on the
degree of suffering or on size. This study demonstrated heterogeneity in SME crisis
survival even within the same subsector, indicating that it is dangerous to perceive
SMEs as either uniformly “flourishing” or “seriously suffering.”
Assessing the Current Stage of Recovery
In 1999 the growth rate of real GDP was a positive 0.3 per cent after a −13.0 per
cent in 1998, meaning that the real GDP started to increase from 1999. However,
the GDP tends to underestimate the economic fall because a decrease in imports
results in an increase in GDP (= consumption + investment + export − import). If
imports mainly consist of finished goods which directly compete with domestic
products, then a decrease in imports implies an increase in domestic output in which
case the GDP statistics work well to measure the level of economic activity and
employment. But in Indonesia three-fourths of imports are raw materials, interme-
diate goods, and capital goods which do not compete with domestic products but
nevertheless are important to support future economic development. So a decrease
in imports is not a good sign. The contribution of imports (share of imports multi-
plied by their growth rate) was −1.7 per cent in 1998 and −14.3 per cent in 1999.
Absorption (consumption + investment + export) decreased by 14.7 per cent in
1998 and 14.0 per cent in 1999. In other words, absorption decreased by almost 30
per cent in two years. The population growth rate is currently around 1.5 per cent,
and the age cohort of the younger generations is relatively big. Given that the popu-
lation between ten to fourteen years of age was 22.58 million in 1996, the annual
increase of the economically active population will be quite big in the near future.
These figures show that the recovery of absorption to the pre-crisis level will take
time. On a per capita basis, if the GDP growth rate is 4–5 per cent annually, it will
take about eight to ten years for recovery.
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In the fourth quarter of 1999 the growth rates of fixed capital formation and
imports in the real GDP statistics showed a return to positive growth after a dura-
tion of negative growth since the start of the Krismon. This may be a sign that the
economy has entered into a new phase of recovery. The recovery of industrializa-
tion in the near future, however, is clouded by at least two uncertainties. The first is
the instability of the rupiah which can fluctuate as much as 20 to 30 per cent in a
few months. Such fluctuations will significantly retard any sustainable course of
recovery in the real sector and hamper industrialists in planning their production
and investment. The government needs to put priority on maintaining political sta-
bility, a primary factor affecting the rupiah at the moment. The second uncertainty
relates to the restructuring of corporate assets. The recapitalization of the banking
sector is nearing completion by the middle of 2000. The next major problem is
corporate restructuring along with debt disposal. As the IBRA (Indonesian Bank
Restructuring Agency) proceeds with the recovery of loan assets from domestic
debtors and the sale of assets submitted by bank shareholders (cum business group
owners) who received huge amounts of liquidity-assistance loan from the central
bank during the crisis, the ownership of corporate assets, including giant manufac-
turing companies under the leading conglomerates of the Soeharto era, is going to
change drastically. This fact indicates that the process of corporate restructuring is
being influenced substantially by the historic transformation of political regime in
Indonesia. The ongoing process of change in ownership and its impact on industrial
performance are major sources of uncertainty. Given these uncertainties, the recov-
ery of Indonesia’s industrial sector is unlikely to move straight ahead in the short
term.
Future Prospects, Policy Priorities, and the Expected Role of the Manufacturing
Sector
The priorities and policies called for at the macro level and the expected role of
the manufacturing sector need to be examined within different time frames.
Over the short term of one to three years great social miseries like poverty and
unemployment will persist, and the Indonesian government will have to maintain
its efforts on short-term social safety net programs. Political stability is one of the
crucial factors for stabilizing the exchange rate and restoring the confidence of
investors. In the manufacturing sector, export promotion and the resultant output
expansion are important for securing job opportunities and increasing employment.
Such efforts have to be based on the currently existing comparative advantage struc-
ture, so resource-intensive and labor-intensive subsectors will be expected to take
up the task. It is difficult to expect any quick recovery of the modern heavy and
chemical manufacturing sector considering the slow recovery of imports and in-
vestment.
In the medium term of five to ten years, the capital-intensive and skilled labor–
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intensive subsectors can be expected to develop as improving political stability will
increase investor confidence in the economy and bring back foreign and domestic
investment. The renewal of infrastructure can be gradually implemented as the
government’s fiscal position improves. The subsectoral shares of light and heavy
industries can be expected to recover to their pre-crisis levels, and once again the
manufacturing sector will further diversify and become the engine of growth. At
this stage inter-firm linkages can be developed driven by market forces between
upstream and downstream manufacturers, large and small industries, and urban and
rural enterprises, which should provide the supporting base of industry.
Over the long run of the next twenty years, Indonesia must renew its efforts to
realize a diversified and harmonized industrial structure and penetrate the world
export market. To achieve this objective the country must climb up the ladder of
technology by improving its industrial technology capabilities and its competitive-
ness in other technologies, and widen its manufacturing base through the cultiva-
tion of supporting industries. Such development needs the development of human
capital through various educational and training institutions. In addition, the better-
ment of environment and natural resources and land preservation will be an impor-
tant component of comprehensive economic and social development. Here human
resource development will be a most useful vehicle for establishing a harmonized
process of industrialization not only by providing the necessary technological knowl-
edge, but also by inspiring the people’s wide social concern and active participa-
tion.
